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Retrieving Realism: A Whiteheadian Wager   
Matthew T. Segall
California Institute of Integral Studies
San Francisco, CA, USA
This essay argues that the organic realism of Alfred North Whitehead (1861-1947) provides 
a viable alternative to anti-realist tendencies in modern and postmodern philosophy since 
Descartes. The metaphysical merits of Whitehead’s philosophy of organism are unpacked 
in conversation with Hubert Dreyfus and Charles Taylor’s recent book Retrieving Realism 
(2015). Like Dreyfus and Taylor, Whitehead’s philosophical project was motivated by a 
desire to heal the modern epistemic wound separating soul from world in order to put human 
consciousness back into meaningful contact with reality. While Dreyfus and Taylor’s book 
succeeds in articulating the problem cogently, its still too phenomenological answer remains 
ontologically unsatisfying.1 Whitehead’s process-relational approach invites philosophy to 
move closer to a real solution.
Whitehead’s protest against the bifurcation of nature and re-imagination of scientific naturalism in panexperientialist terms 
advances Dreyfus and Taylor’s otherwise intractable 
struggle to root out and untangle the modern metaphysical 
topology they call “mediationalism.” Mediationalism 
is operative in any philosophy presupposing an “inner-
outer structure” whereby “we grasp external reality 
[only] through internal representations” (Dreyfus & 
Taylor, 2015, pp. 2-3). The mediational frame begins 
with the basic assumption that minds have ideas about 
things. What at first may seem an obvious, commonsense 
construal of the way human beings relate to reality has 
led many of the modern philosophers who tried to work 
out the details into notoriously stubborn antinomies, 
paradoxes, and hard problems. Mediationalism has 
inhibited philosophy’s capacity for world disclosure by 
construing the mind’s grasp of the world as somehow 
“in us” rather than in the transaction, “the interspace 
of our dealings with things” (Dreyfus & Taylor, 2015, 
p. 93). The modern picture of reality, because it denies 
what Dreyfus and Taylor referred to as the interspace 
between mind and world, turns out to be rather violently 
incoherent. The challenges faced by a diverse planetary 
society demand of the philosophical community that 
some integral cosmic imaginary be articulated within 
which the salvific fruits of the world’s spiritual traditions 
and the scientific truths of modern physics, biology, and 
psychology can hang together with equal ontological 
weight. The articulation of such an integral imaginary will 
be essential for the human species’ successful navigation 
of the fast approaching evolutionary bottleneck caused 
by anthropogenic climate change and geopolitical 
instability. The modern mediational topology stubbornly 
persists in contemporary philosophy, even among the 
many postmoderns who purport to be criticizing it. 
Dreyfus and Taylor themselves at certain critical junctures 
remained tied to the topology of the mediational stance, 
most strikingly when they slip back into the modern 
bifurcation separating meaningless physical causation 
from embodied meanings and mental reasons. A less 
dualistic interpretation of modern scientific findings 
is possible, one that avoids the pitfalls of materialistic 
reductionism and skeptical relativism alike.
 This essay is divided into two parts. The first 
part reviews Dreyfus and Taylor’s attempt to overcome 
mediationalism by integrating the objective knowledge 
claimed by modern scientific naturalism with the moral 
and spiritual values defended by inclusive humanism. 
The second part turns to Whitehead’s process-relational 
philosophy of organism in order to offer a more coherent 
retrieval of realism. This Whiteheadian interpolation 
is part of an effort the present author has elsewhere 
characterized as the “re-enchantment project” (Segall, 
2013c). An emerging wave of integral philosophers 
have grown tired of the self-defeating hyper-critique 
of moderns and postmoderns alike, and are ready to 
begin in earnest the difficult task of re-imagining a non-
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modern, post-secular, re-enchanted, pluralistic, and 
participatory cosmological scheme (see Segall, 2012 and 
Segall, 2016a), a scheme unhampered by the confusions 
and contradictions inherent to the mediational picture 
that Dreyfus and Taylor argue has consciously or 
unconsciously framed Western thought since the 17th 
century.
Part 1: The mediational frame
Dreyfus and Taylor began their argument by retracing the history of modern European philosophy in 
order to uncover the wrong turn that led Western culture 
into a distorted understanding of knowledge and its 
relationship (or lack thereof ) to reality. Unsurprisingly, 
much of the blame falls on René Descartes. Dreyfus and 
Taylor remind their readers that Descartes’ skeptical, 
dualistic distortion of the human condition—what they 
referred to as the mediational theory of knowledge—is 
of far more than merely theoretical interest, since this 
framework is directly responsible for generating the 
contradictory ethical, existential, and (a)theological 
commitments characteristic of modernity and its 
postmodern aftermath. The distorted mediational theory 
has condemned modern people to experience themselves 
as “divided beings needing to be healed” (Dreyfus & 
Taylor, 2015, p. 26). As first articulated by Descartes, 
the mediational theory is based upon the foundational 
assumption that mind is entirely separate from matter, 
and that mind therefore gains knowledge of external 
matter only through its own internal representations or 
ideas. Dreyfus and Taylor (2015) referred to this original 
form of mediationalism as “representationalist,” but they 
are careful to note that this “much refuted” paradigm 
is only one among a variety of mediational theories all 
sharing the same “deeper topology” (p. 3). One of the 
key features distinguishing this deeper topology is the 
“‘only through’ structure” (p. 10): a mind’s or organism’s 
epistemic access to external nature comes only through 
structures endogenous to the mind or organism. Other 
variants of mediationalism noted by Dreyfus and Taylor 
include Immanuel Kant’s critical turn, which although 
it re-imagined the meaning of inner and outer still 
enforces the only through structure and the gap between 
knowledge and reality; Willard Quine’s materialist turn, 
which denies the existence of mind and claims scientific 
knowledge of nature comes instead to the brain only 
through sensory receptors; Rorty’s linguistic turn, which 
claims that knowledge comes only through intersubjective 
agreement between publicly expressed sentences; and 
finally the computational turn, which claims that the 
brain acts as a kind of hardware supporting the mind 
as its software or operating system, with knowledge 
coming only through the internal processing of external 
information. 
 The alternative to mediationalism offered by 
Dreyfus and Taylor is referred to as a contact theory of 
knowledge. Their contact theory aims to provide an 
unmediated grip on reality without falling prey to an 
overly naïve realism. Dreyfus and Taylor sympathetically 
summarized the ancient contact epistemologies of Plato 
and Aristotle, admitting, however, that these original 
contact theories are ultimately insufficient. Despite 
their admirable sophistication, the theories of Plato 
and Aristotle, according to Dreyfus and Taylor (2015), 
have become ontologically implausible as a result of 
modern scientific materialism’s dismissal of the sort of 
“cosmically embedded teleology” (p. 18) presupposed 
by ancient philosophers. Dreyfus and Taylor (2015) 
turned instead to the 20th century contact theories of 
Martin Heidegger, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, and Ludwig 
Wittgenstein, theories that apparently do not rely 
upon any cosmic teleology but instead rest upon thick 
descriptions of a more down to earth “primordial and 
indissoluble involvement in . . . reality” (p. 18).
 There are, of course, important ethical 
motivations that lend support to the mediational 
theory. According to Dreyfus and Taylor (2015), the 
disengaged, critical stance fostered by mediationalism 
contributed to the modern ideals of personal freedom, 
self-responsibility, the rejection of unjustified authority, 
and the technological mastery of nature. But, the authors 
cautioned, these ideals are double-edged, since they also 
function to cut human society off from a supposedly 
disenchanted and mechanized physical world, to alienate 
supposedly autonomous individuals from an increasingly 
mass-minded society, and to dissociate rational public 
personas from private emotional inner lives, thereby 
alienating individuals even from themselves. 
 Dreyfus and Taylor attempted to show the way 
out of the mediational frame by developing a contact-
theoretical alternative to modern philosophy’s bifurcated 
view of a deterministic nature passively apprehended by 
a spontaneously reflective mind. The intractability of 
the problem of how to account for experience in terms 
both active and passive is made especially evident in the 
extreme solutions proposed by post-Cartesian modern 
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philosophers: for example, the idealist Gottfried Leibniz 
posited that experience is actively constructed inside 
windowless monads, while the empiricist David Hume 
had it that experience is the result of passive sensations 
associated within a mind that is all window. Kant’s 
transcendental turn was an attempt to find a middle 
path between the extreme positions of rationalists like 
Leibniz and empiricists like Hume. Dreyfus and Taylor 
turned to Heidegger’s, Wittgenstein’s, and Merleau-
Ponty’s elaborations upon the Kantian discovery that 
every particular sensory impression or bit of information 
presupposes the conceptual unity of a network of 
propositions and the holistic meaning of a spatiotemporal 
background. Kant brought the contextualizing conditions 
that had been hidden by Cartesian epistemology out 
into the open for the first time. Heidegger applied the 
Kantian form of argument to reveal the inadequacy of 
mediationalism’s supposition that the subject initially 
encounters the world as a collection of neutral objects, 
and only subsequently projects meaning onto them based 
on its own subjective concerns. Instead, for Heidegger, 
concernful involvement with the world is the paradigmatic 
form of experience. This more primordial form of worldly 
embeddedness is the abiding condition making possible 
the disengaged, neutral descriptions of the natural sciences. 
Wittgenstein, for his part, extended Kant’s critique of 
the atomism of sensory information by critiquing the 
atomic theory of linguistic meaning. The standard theory 
of linguistic meaning going back to Augustine held that 
the meaning of a word comes from the mediating role 
it plays in linking an internal mental concept with the 
external object that it signifies. Wittgenstein argued 
that the ostensive definitions upon which this theory 
is based presuppose the implicit grammatical workings 
of language and the pre-understandings baked into a 
culture’s view of the world. It follows that the meaning 
of language is not rooted in concept-word-thing relations 
established by individual minds, but rather depends 
upon the shared form of life of the society within which 
language-speakers are enculturated. Finally, Merleau-
Ponty took the mediational theory to task for ignoring 
the bodily, sensorimotor basis of experience. Rather 
than needing to formally represent or form explicit 
beliefs about the features of an environment in order 
to successfully navigate through it, Merleau-Ponty 
eloquently described how the lived body puts one in 
direct pre-conceptual touch with the surrounding world, 
such that one can skillfully cope with the affordances 
it provides for activities without having to consciously 
reflect upon or purposefully design action in advance of 
environmental engagements. 
 Contrary to the reductive computational or 
cognitivist theory of experience, wherein formal symbolic 
representations of atomistic sensory inputs (so-called) 
allow an internal picture of the world to be constructed 
as a basis for action (as so-called output), Dreyfus and 
Taylor built on Heidegger, Wittgenstein, and Merleau-
Ponty to argue for a gestalt view of experience wherein 
reflective, representational, or conceptually attentive 
consciousness is always already embedded within and 
emergent from skillful embodied coping in everyday 
social situations. Here, Dreyfus and Taylor could have 
drawn upon the embodied or enactive approach of 
Francisco Varela et al. (1992; see also Evan Thompson, 
2007). A complex holistic understanding of the world, 
an immediate grasp of its bodily affordances and social 
meanings, is not an internal representation inferentially 
constructed out of simple sensory inputs. As Whitehead 
(1979) remarked after critiquing the mediational view 
(though he did not call it that), “A young man does not 
initiate his experience by dancing with impressions of 
sensation, and then proceed to conjecture a partner” 
(pp. 315-316). The man is first of all in contact with 
his dancing partner, and only afterwards (if he is of an 
especially scientific bent) formulates skeptical epistemic 
conjectures about his partner’s status as a collection of 
colorful shapes projected upon his retina (Whitehead’s 
construal is unpacked in the next section in terms 
of his distinction between two modes of experience: 
presentational immediacy and causal efficacy). 
 John McDowell’s (1994) critique of the dualism 
between the space of reasons and the space of causes 
also partially aligns with Dreyfus and Taylor’s (2015) 
approach in that both understand perception as actively 
engaged with and spontaneously responsive to the 
physical constraints of the body and its environmental 
affordances. Perception is thus not merely the passive 
reception or effect of causal stimuli. But their approaches 
differ in that Dreyfus and Taylor saw the affordance-
attunement and engaged spontaneity of perception as 
a preconceptual skill, while McDowell argued that all 
worldly engagement presupposes “a propositionally 
structured totality of facts” (Dreyfus & Taylor, 2015, p. 
84) such that human “perception is conceptual all the 
way out” (p. 77). Dreyfus and Taylor (2015) defended the 
notion of a meaningful preconceptual space irreducible 
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to the supposedly non-teleological causes operating in 
the natural world by offering two compellingly concrete 
examples of it: first, a young boy learning the name for 
the “stepping stones” of which he already possessed a 
prereflexive, embodied understanding (since he used 
them to hop across the creek each day without having 
a name for them) provides an example of “prelinguistic 
perception” (p. 85); second, a professor lost in thought 
while driving to the office and later successfully 
reporting a detail about his trip provides an example 
of “prepropositional” perception (p. 86). While they 
admitted McDowell may have an adequate account for 
the second example (since the professor already knew the 
name for the detail in question), with the first example, 
the boy clearly had some kind of skillful understanding 
of the stepping stones prior to learning their name or 
even consciously reflecting upon them. He was thus 
preconceptually familiar with them as meaningful 
features of his world prior to being able to talk or form 
logical propositions about them.2 
 Richard Rorty engaged in a decades-long 
debate with Dreyfus and Taylor regarding the need for 
a more adequate account of knowledge to replace the 
mediational theory. Rorty preferred to just walk away 
from the mediational problem space by accepting rival 
philosophical theories as equally justified ways of talking 
about and coping within a diversity of social habitats, 
while Dreyfus and Taylor argued that the problem space 
can and must be recast so as to offer a more adequate 
account. From their perspective, philosophers need to 
decide whether the mediational or contact theory of 
knowledge is more adequate. Taylor and Dreyfus (2015) 
thus differentiate their “robust” realism from Rorty’s 
“deflationary” realism (p. 132). While Rorty found the 
idea of an objective view from nowhere unintelligible, 
they argued that the objects studied by natural science 
must constitute an independent reality, a world that exists 
entirely in itself and in no way for us (nor, presumably, 
for itself). They argued both that some version of the 
correspondence theory of truth can be salvaged that 
would grant objective knowledge of nature, and that 
this knowledge remained nonetheless dependent upon 
and emergent out of concernful engagement with the 
world. It is not clear that Dreyfus and Taylor were able 
to make these two claims hang together. As is unpacked 
below, realism can be retrieved without marshaling 
the idea of a deworlded reality of meaningless material 
objects. Dreyfus and Taylor (2015) went on to develop 
an eleven-stage account of how “causal contacts with 
the physical world” become linked with the space of 
reasons and justified beliefs (pp. 88-89). In the earliest 
of these stages, they repeatedly referred to processes 
of optimization, balancing, and sensitivity as part of an 
explanation for how preconceptual contact with the 
physical world becomes conceptualized and linguistically 
articulated. These references are returned to below, as 
it is unclear what sense can be made of the occurrence 
of such preconceptual but nonetheless teleological and 
mentalistic processes given Dreyfus and Taylor’s apparent 
deference to the ontology of scientific materialism when 
it comes to the  ultimate structure of reality. 
 Contact theorists all share a rejection of 
mechanistic reductionism, which attempts to explain 
thinking in terms of neurophysiological computations 
inside the brain. This sort of explanation, they argue, is 
still residually Cartesian and thus held captive within the 
mediational frame. Knowledge, for Dreyfus and Taylor, 
is not inside the mind or the skull of the knower and is 
not separated from the world in any way. If all knowing 
arises through embodied and socially embedded action 
in the world, then “the understanding I have of the 
world is not simply one constructed or determined 
by me”; rather, it “is a co-production of me and the 
world” (Dreyfus & Taylor, 2015, p. 93). Preconceptual 
understanding is thus said to occur in the transaction or 
interspace between subject and object, rather than in the 
subject alone. Dreyfus and Taylor were clearly aware of 
the need to overcome the gap between causal nature and 
conceptual thought, but for reasons unpacked in part 2, 
Whitehead’s philosophy of organism does the job in an 
even more compelling and coherent way.  
 Dreyfus and Taylor (2015) cashed out 
their contact theory in an argument on behalf of 
inclusive humanism: the idea that some embodied 
phenomenological fusion of horizons is possible that 
allows different cultures to coordinate their schemes 
according to the same underlying “target area” (p. 
114). Even if the human species’ currently established 
diversity of cultural perspectives appear irreconcilable, 
all humans can at least agree upon the need to continue 
to improve their view of the way things are (i.e., 
facts) and on what matters most (i.e., values). Human 
capacities for “intercorporeality” and “linguisticality,” as 
well as openness to risking one’s own identity in order 
to understand others, together constitute something 
like a human nature, even if this essential humanness 
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remains aspirational rather than normal (i.e., an ideal 
description of our highest potential) (Dreyfus & Taylor, 
2015, pp. 118-125). Despite Dreyfus and Taylor’s (2015) 
optimistic “humanist faith” (p. 129), they admit that “the 
possibility of ultimate noncalibration [between different 
cultures] must be kept open” (p. 130). Nothing can 
assure in advance that efforts toward horizonal fusion 
or translation between any two or especially between 
all cultures will succeed. They therefore referred to their 
approach as a “plural realism” (Dreyfus & Taylor, 2015, 
p. 168): even if modern science must be said to come 
to grips with things as they exist in themselves, this still 
leaves open “the possibility that there are a plurality of 
revealing perspectives on the world (nature, cosmos, 
universe)” (p. 154).  
 Jorge Ferrer’s (2002, 2008, 2017) participatory 
understanding of religious and cultural difference is 
especially relevant to Dreyfus and Taylor’s search for 
a plural realism. Like Dreyfus and Taylor, Ferrer’s 
participatory approach seeks a third way between the 
two extremes of scientistic or religious dogmatism 
and cultural relativism. Ferrer’s (2017) participatory 
theory has thus far focused more on religious pluralism, 
construing the various forms of human religious belief and 
practice in terms of the participatory “interaction of all 
human attributes [rational, imaginal, somatic, aesthetic, 
contemplative, etc.] and an undetermined mystery or 
creative dynamism of life or the cosmos” (p. 227). From 
the perspective of Ferrer’s participatory pluralism, while 
some sort of planetary ethos to regulate intercultural 
encounters may be necessary (an ethos rooted in a shared 
commitment to overcoming selfishness and striving to 
embody and integrate the full suite of human potentials), 
the sort of horizonal fusion of cultures sought by Dreyfus 
and Taylor is no longer the aim, and so the lack of such 
calibration is not considered a failure. Rather, Ferrer (2017) 
envisions the cosmic mystery and its human cocreators “as 
moving from a primordial state of undifferentiated unity 
toward one of infinite differentiation-in-communion” 
(p. 239). The aim, therefore, is not to collapse difference 
into sameness, but to celebrate open-ended “processes 
of cosmological hybridization” (Ferrer, 2017, p. 239).3 
The “ultimate unity of the mystery” at the heart of all 
religious cosmologies is thus not only preserved from “the 
reductionisms of cultural-linguistic, psychological, and 
biologically naturalistic explanations,” its “ontological 
richness” is enhanced by the open-ended potential 
for the cocreative emergence of new spiritual worlds 
(Ferrer, 2017, p. 228). Ferrer (2017) pointed to the 
“metaphysical or deep pluralism” (p. 226) articulated by a 
number of Whiteheadian process theologians, including 
John Cobb, Jr. (1999) and David Ray Griffin (2005), as 
a potential alternative to shallower forms of postmodern 
cultural relativism. But Ferrer (2017) quickly rejects these 
attempts to interpret the variety of religious ultimates 
in terms of Whitehead’s dipolar divinity (i.e., God is 
conceived as a process including both a primordial/
transcendent pole and a consequent/immanent pole) 
because, he argues, such “procrustean theistic molds” do 
violence to the rich diversity of spiritual enactments of 
the ultimate mystery (p. 227). As is unpacked in part 
2, alternative interpretations of Whitehead’s process-
relational theology are possible that may bring it more 
into alignment with participatory theory.4
 The participatory approach could just as 
illuminatingly be applied to more general ontological 
questions of ultimate reality. Indeed, Ferrer’s approach 
builds on the work of Richard Tarnas (1991, 2006), 
whose third way beyond dogmatism and relativism (the 
twin dangers of the mediational frame) converges with 
Dreyfus and Taylor’s (2015) sense of reality as “a co-
production of me and the world” (p. 93). “The human 
spirit does not merely prescribe nature’s phenomenal 
order,” writes Tarnas (1991):
rather, the spirit of nature brings forth its own 
order through the human mind when that mind 
is employing its full complement of faculties—
intellectual, volitional, emotional, sensory, 
imaginative, aesthetic, epiphanic. In such 
knowledge, the human mind “lives into” the 
creative activity of nature. Then the world speaks 
its meaning through human consciousness. Then 
human language itself can be recognized as rooted in 
a deeper reality, as reflecting the universe’s unfolding 
meaning. Through the human intellect, in all its 
personal individuality, contingency, and struggle, 
the world’s evolving thought-content achieves 
conscious articulation. Yes, knowledge of the world 
is structured by the mind’s subjective contribution; 
but that contribution is teleologically called forth 
by the universe for its own self-revelation. Human 
thought does not and cannot mirror a ready-made 
objective truth in the world; rather, the world’s truth 
achieves its existence when it comes to birth in the 
human mind. (p. 435)
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 While Dreyfus and Taylor (2015) express 
skepticism of the sort of “cosmically embedded teleology” 
(p. 168) affirmed by Tarnas, their own contact theory 
appears to presuppose it, if not at the macro scale, then 
at least at more local levels. Whitehead’s cosmological 
scheme reinterprets micro and macro scale teleological 
processes as fully consistent with the evidence of 
contemporary natural science, thereby alleviating 
Dreyfus and Taylor’s concerns that such processes have 
been ruled out by modern scientific findings. 
 Dreyfus and Taylor’s book partially succeeds 
not only because it makes the inadequacy of the modern 
mediational picture evident, but because it reveals the 
way this picture continues to covertly dominate the 
anti-foundational and anti-representational postmodern 
thinking that purports to have escaped it. By building 
on Heidegger, Wittgenstein, and Merleau-Ponty’s 
“reembedding of thought and knowledge in the bodily 
and social-cultural context in which it takes place” 
(Dreyfus & Taylor, 2015, p. 18), the authors lucidly 
articulated how and why the engaged mode of coping 
with an affordance-rich world of meaningful bodily 
concern developmentally precedes the disengaged stance 
that natural science employs in its attempt to neutrally 
describe, as if from nowhere, a meaningless world of 
material particles. Where their book fell short was in its 
attempt to articulate a metaphysically coherent contact 
theory that would release us from the epistemic captivity 
of the bifurcated conception of nature. They clearly saw 
that a more adequate picture would need to overcome 
the bifurcation between the traditional concepts of 
mental spontaneity and physical necessity. But by 
effectively ceding physical ontology to the mechanistic 
world picture of post-Galilean science, their proposed 
compromise leaves philosophy stuck, despite all their 
protestations against it, in the same old conceptual grid 
separating human meanings (even if these are said to 
emerge from embodied coping and worldly attunement) 
from natural mechanisms. 
 That they end up ceding this territory to 
mechanistic science is strange, since Dreyfus and 
Taylor themselves are careful to warn philosophy 
against the reification that results “from ontologizing 
the canonical procedures of modern epistemology” (p. 
33). The ontologization of the disengaged method of 
access during the modern period, such that it became 
an all-encompassing theory of reality, led philosophers 
(including materialists, idealists, and dualists) to pose 
all the wrong questions, chief among them the primary 
problem of mediationalism: how do meaningful mental 
images in here relate to neutral material impacts out 
there? The “hard problem of consciousness,” despite 
tremendous advances in the neurosciences, remains as 
salient today as it was for Descartes in the 17th century 
(Chalmers, 1995). Modern philosophers have put the 
wrong end first in their attempts to know the world, 
as though knowledge was produced inside the mind 
through the internal representation of an external reality. 
On the contrary, “my first understanding of reality is 
not a picture I am forming of it, but the sense given to 
a continuing transaction with it” (Dreyfus & Taylor, 
2015, p. 70). Humans are first of all beings-in-the-world, 
participants in cosmic becoming, and only later become 
capable of abstract theorization about the possibility of 
an “external” world. 
 Faced with such poorly posed problems, 
Wittgenstein and Rorty’s prescription is that philosophers 
simply change the subject. But this is insufficient, since, 
as Dreyfus and Taylor make clear, the question remains as 
to whether the embedded or the disengaged conception 
of knowledge is more adequate. Certainly, the empirico-
mathematical methods of modern science have proven 
exceedingly useful by increasing humanity’s ability to 
predict and control many physical processes. But to 
ontologize the mediational premises of the instrumental 
method into a picture of what the universe is supposed 
to be in itself is to  commit Whitehead’s (1967) famous 
“fallacy of misplaced concreteness” (p. 51) by substituting 
an abstract mechanical model for the living cosmos 
encountered in our embodied experience. Indeed, 
in many instances acting on knowledge provided by 
mechanistic models actually does violence to the ecology 
of organisms it is supposed to have explained. In truth, 
modern scientific epistemology (or “technoscience”5) 
gives us more power over than knowledge of nature. When 
it claims mechanistic knowledge of nature, natural 
science puts the wrong end of the epistemic cart first. 
If Dreyfus and Taylor (2015) were serious about the 
“necessary sequence in the genesis of modes” (p. 36) that 
places the learning processes of embodied coping before 
and beneath the knowledge produced by disengaged 
scientific theorizing, they cannot then go on to insist that 
the disengaged mode somehow conceptually transcends 
or is logically independent of the embedded mode and 
thus justified in its claims to a view from nowhere. If 
the goal is to imagine an ontology that avoids the 
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paradoxes and quandaries of mediationalism, then that 
ontology must avoid metaphysically dividing scientific 
logic from the physics it is supposed to be describing. 
Somehow or other, the physicist’s knowledge must itself 
be an expression of physical processes. An experiential 
continuity must link knower with known. No scientist, 
not even Galileo or Newton, constructs their models of 
nature entirely out of clear and distinct logical premises. 
All scientific knowledge not only presupposes bodily 
engagement and energetic transaction with concrete 
natural processes, it is itself an expression of these energetic 
processes. So while their protests against the dominance 
of Cartesian epistemology can be applauded, Dreyfus 
and Taylor were too quick to cede all authority on the 
ontology of nature to a still residually Cartesian construal 
of scientific naturalism.
 Having sketched Dreyfus and Taylor’s admirable 
but incomplete attempt to overcome mediationalism, this 
essay now turns to examine Whitehead’s radical approach 
to overcoming the mediational frame.  
Part 2: A Whiteheadian Wager
Whitehead’s organic realism provides an ontological grounding for the embedded, embodied, and 
engaged phenomenological account offered not only 
by Dreyfus and Taylor, but by kindred thinkers like 
Francisco Varela, Evan Thompson, and Eugene Gendlin. 
Dreyfus and Taylor’s account would have benefited 
from an encounter with Gendlin’s (1962) process 
modeling of the relation between concepts and their 
“implicit experiential context” (p. xii). Like Dreyfus and 
Taylor, and in line with Whitehead’s radically empirical 
panexperientialism, Gendlin reverses the epistemic 
hierarchy typical of Western philosophy by reminding 
philosophers that living experience precedes and grounds 
reflective cognition: “Rather than giving some cognitive 
system priority and reading it into experience,” Gendlin 
(1962) writes, 
our philosophy recognizes the priority of making 
experiential sense (as in metaphors or in speaking 
from a felt sense). Once that has occurred, we 
can explain it by interpolating cognitive units in 
retrospect (but this is a further experiential process 
which brings new further implications). The 
reversal makes a new and more radical empiricism 
possible…It leads to an empiricism that is not 
naive. (p. xix)
Gendlin went on to align himself with Whitehead’s 
re-imagination of Western philosophy’s erroneous 
bifurcation between pure sensory qualia (colors and 
sounds, etc.) and pure logic (concepts and propositions). 
In place of the old qualia/logic duality, Whitehead 
references (in Gendlin’s words) the “many, many 
organismic feelings” (p. 94) that compose our ongoing 
experiencing. Logic, too, becomes a form of organismic 
feeling, an expression of our subtlest contacts with the 
contours of reality.
 From a Whiteheadian point of view, bringing 
forth a robustly realist cosmological scheme no longer 
held captive by the mediational frame first requires 
overcoming the bifurcation of nature. This entails 
re-imagining experience as decidedly not just an 
epiphenomenal ghost caged within skulls or hidden 
beneath skin, nor even as a mysterious interspace 
that emerges between human subjects and objective 
constraints. It is necessary, rather, to develop a more 
generic conception of experience as intrinsic to and 
pervasive throughout the micro- and macro-processes 
composing the physical world. It is not enough to pose 
the question of whether a third preconceptual experiential 
space might be carved out between the space of natural 
causes and the space of human reasons and then punt the 
ontological football by declaring that we always implicitly 
“live” the answer to this question without being able to 
explicitly think it (Dreyfus & Taylor, 2015, p. 125). If 
this were an adequate answer to the question they posed, 
Dreyfus and Taylor would have had little need to spend 
168 carefully argued pages attempting to make the 
inexplicable explicit. Surely not prosaic philosophy but 
poetry would have been the more appropriate medium 
in this case. Even after forgiving this shortcoming in their 
argument, a further issue remains: upon what realistic or 
ontological (i.e., non-phenomenological) basis can they 
establish their preconceptual interspace? Part of their 
way around the aporia of mediational dualism requires 
presupposing human agency (intentions, purposes, aims, 
desires, optimizations, balancings, and so forth), but 
such agency is precisely what is forbidden by the anti-
teleological understanding of the space of causes claimed 
by modern scientific materialism. Either everything—
including organic life and human consciousness—is 
explainable in terms of physical causes as scientific 
materialists currently conceive them, or the mechanistic 
world picture of scientific materialism is mistaken. Dreyfus 
and Taylor (2015) are unwilling to challenge the “solidly 
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established” (p. 68) Galilean-Newtonian conception of 
nature, even while they show no restraint demolishing 
the mediational stance that provided this conception with 
its philosophical justification. If their own convincing 
argument regarding the ontological inadequacy of 
the mediational conception underlying the Galilean-
Newtonian picture of nature was not enough on its 
own to call this picture into question, then it is unclear 
(especially given their reliance on a supersessionist 
interpretation of scientific paradigms) why the complete 
demolition of the 17th century mechanistic cosmology 
by 20th century relativity, quantum, and complexity 
theories did not warrant even a mention in their book.6
 It could be that Dreyfus and Taylor did not 
detect the relevance of these new scientific revolutions 
to their attempted retrieval of realism. Whitehead, one 
of the most capable mathematicians in the world at the 
start of the 20th century, was especially well-positioned 
to understand the significance of the breakdown of the 
old Galilean-Newtonian framework. For Whitehead, 
the newly emerging scientific understandings of spatio-
temporal relativity, quantum non-locality, and the 
complex causality of self-organization had inescapable 
philosophical implications.7 He was thus led into the 
philosophy of science in search of a more participatory 
epistemology than the disengaged rationality inherited 
from Descartes and Kant. It was not long before he was 
forced all the way into the riskier adventure of full-blown 
metaphysics. “The recourse to metaphysics,” according 
to Whitehead (1920), “is like throwing a match into the 
powder magazine. It blows up the whole arena” (p. 29). 
Thinking with Whitehead requires accepting his wager 
that blowing up the mediational frame that modern and 
postmodern philosophers have agreed (consciously or 
not) to play their dualistic conceptual games within is 
the only viable path forward, at least if a comprehensive 
and meaningful picture of the world is to be sought. The 
entire confused conceptual edifice that isolates minds 
from things behind signs must be demolished before a 
more coherent, integral vision of reality can be imagined. 
Meaning runs far deeper than designation. Philosophers 
will never be able to think the mind’s connection to nature 
if they conceive of the latter as a collection of isolated 
things. This is because meaningful experience cannot 
be composed out of independent things. Experience, as 
Whitehead re-imagines it, is constituted by interrelated 
events. The ontology of an event cannot be captured by 
the mental representation of material things or structures; 
rather, Whitehead’s process-relational ontology replaces 
the mediational framework of substance dualism and 
mental representation with novel concepts of processual 
polarity and prehensive unification. Mind and matter 
are thus not conceived of as separate substances but as 
poles in dynamic tension with one another, each one 
contributing to the unification of every actual occasion 
of experience in the creative advance of nature. The 
distinction between mental thoughts and physical things 
is not denied by Whitehead, but shifted from a spatial and 
substance-based framework into a genetic and process-
relational one. Meaningful experience is constituted 
by the growing together (or, in Whitehead’s terms, the 
concrescence) of the stubborn facts of the past with the 
novel possibilities for the future that these facts afford 
the present. The past lingers in our physical feelings and 
corporeal habits, even in the very morphology of our 
skeletal muscles (reflecting the decision of our human 
ancestors to walk upright), while the future goads us ever 
onward, quickening the mind with youthful ideals as 
yet unrealized. “Science is concerned with the facts of 
bygone transition,” that is, with the past, while “[it] is the 
religious impulse in the world which transforms the dead 
facts of science into the living drama of history”; it is for 
this reason, Whitehead (1968) continues, that “science 
can never foretell the perpetual novelty of history” (p. 
105). A new world-picture must acknowledge the 
scientific evidences of past facts as well as the religious 
evidences of future values. It must account for the 
meaning of experience, of being here, in its full temporal 
depth. 
 Dreyfus and Taylor (2015) are not wrong in their 
assurance that the continued success of the natural sciences 
(success measured, presumably, in the instrumental terms 
of prediction and control) “depends on [their] not being 
so out of touch” with reality (p. 56). The cosmological 
questions that Whitehead allows philosophers to ask by 
demolishing the Galilean-Newtonian world-picture are 
not at all predicated upon a denial of natural science’s 
contact with actual nature: “I assume as an axiom that 
science is not a fairy tale” (Whitehead, 1920, p. 40). The 
scientific method indeed puts the mind in touch with 
a real world. Given the ontogenetic priority of engaged 
coping over disengaged reflection, how could this not be 
the case? Scientists have never simply been modest and 
withdrawn observers reflecting upon reality, but always 
active experimenters engaged in reality. Further, they 
are themselves expressions of the reality they experiment 
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upon and theorize about. Acknowledging natural science’s 
practical engagement with and predictive control over 
nature is not the same as saying that its mechanical models 
of nature are identical to nature, are the way nature is. It 
cannot be repeated enough that a coherent world-picture 
requires that the nature known to science be capable of 
producing scientific knowledge as one of its expressions. 
If science’s idea of nature is not so capable (as is the case 
with the mechanistic picture, for which the emergence 
of living organisms and especially of intelligent minds 
remains an incomprehensible miracle), then clearly 
the picture is too abstract and has failed to account for 
what has actually occured in our universe. The analytic 
methods of Descartes, Galileo, and Newton did not really 
sever the embodied continuum linking the meaningful 
emotions of the soul to the supposedly mechanical 
motions of nature. What happened is that a convenient 
method of parsing experience was falsely reified into a 
bifurcated ontology, leading modern Western people to 
believe, tragically, that they had disenchanted the world 
(Latour, 1993, p. 114ff). Moderns convinced themselves 
that the whole universe comes to nothing through the 
anthropocentric conceit that all meaning is lodged within 
the human skull. 
 Whitehead’s cosmology is an invitation to 
consider an alternative vision that is not only compatible 
with but also more coherently integrates what natural 
science has revealed about the universe over the last 
century. Philosophers need not continue to commit 
what Whitehead diagnosed as “the fallacy of misplaced 
concreteness” by mistaking abstract models of reality 
for concrete transactions with it. Philosophers still 
always inhabit a universe of inextricably meaningful 
relationships, “acting in and on a world that also acts 
on us,” as Dreyfus and Taylor (2015) put it (p. 18). 
The classical scientific concept of causality makes it 
impossible to understand how the physical world’s 
action on minds could be anything but the impact of 
blind forces devoid of intrinsic meaning or value, thereby 
opening an unbridgeable gap between the deterministic 
space of causes and the voluntaristic space of reasons. 
Whitehead’s philosophy of organism is a protest against 
this way of constructing the metaphysical arena. “What 
I am essentially protesting against,” Whitehead (1920) 
explains, 
is the bifurcation of nature into two systems of reality 
. . . , namely into the nature apprehended in awareness 
and the nature which is the cause of awareness. The 
nature which is the fact apprehended in awareness 
holds within it the greenness of the trees, the song of 
the birds, the warmth of the sun, the hardness of the 
chairs, and the feel of the velvet. The nature which is 
the cause of awareness is the conjectured system of 
molecules and electrons which so affects the mind 
as to produce the awareness of apparent nature. The 
meeting point of these two natures is the mind, the 
causal nature being influent and the apparent nature 
being effluent . . . Thus there would be two natures, 
one is the conjecture and the other is the dream. (pp. 
30-31)
 Whitehead (1920) did not just protest against 
the bifurcation of nature, he articulated an integral 
cosmological vision that accounts for “the all-embracing 
relations” (p. 31) active in a human person’s felt experience 
of warmth as much as in the energetic vibrations of 
photons radiating to them from the Sun. What does the 
experience of warmth have in common with photons 
radiating from the Sun? How do the two aspects of 
reality hang together? Whitehead’s bold re-imagining 
of the mediational frame beckons us to inhabit a world 
wherein experience as such—James’ “pure experience” 
(1904)—is the all-embracing relation that permits 
transmission across the chasm that only seems to separate 
physical nature from meaningful mind. The cosmos is 
not composed of bits of material scattered in empty space 
obeying fixed, externally imposed laws, but an evolving 
community of experiential agencies, or what Whitehead 
calls organic societies of actual occasions, actively and 
sensitively engaging in an ongoing “choreography of 
coexistence,” to use Varela and Maturana’s (1992, p. 248) 
wonderful turn of phrase.
 Varela’s autopoietic paradigm in biology (Weber 
& Varela, 2002), and he, Thompson, and Eleanor Rosch’s 
(1992) enactive paradigm in cognitive psychology (see 
also Thompson, 2007) provide examples of organic 
as opposed to mechanistic approaches to the natural 
sciences. Such approaches follow James, Whitehead, 
and Gendlin in taking the embodied roots of experience 
seriously. Varela and Weber (2002) have argued that 
“organisms can be said to transcend the neutrality of 
pure physics and to create . . . an intentional world”; 
organisms are thus “subjective in the strong sense of the 
word” (p. 118). Thompson (2007) once denied that 
single cells have anything like intentionality (p. 161). 
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In conversation with the present author, Thompson 
has come to described his more recent work as “a 
rethinking of the concept of ‘nature’ in a post-physicalist 
[and post-dualist] way,” cautioning, however, that this 
“doesn’t entail that nature is intrinsically or essentially 
experiential” (Segall, 2013b). Whitehead’s cosmological 
scheme’s most important divergence from embodied 
or enactive phenomenology is that it affirms nature’s 
intrinsic experientiality. From Whitehead’s perspective, 
not doing so leaves philosophy with no less profound an 
ontological gap than that left by Descartes. If this is no 
longer a gap between mental and material substances, 
then it is still a gap between supposedly neutral physical 
processes and the values and concerns of biological 
organisms. Whitehead’s panexperientialism goes beyond 
the still residually bifurcated autopoietic paradigm by 
denying the supposed purity of physics: organismic 
feelings are as intrinsic to physical processes as they are to 
psychical processes. 
 Whitehead sometimes referred to his philosophy 
of organism as a speculative form of realism. Indeed, 
this seems to be the reason for Thompson’s resistance 
to it (“I [Thompson] don’t think we are in a position 
to know [what panexperientialists claim we can know]” 
(Segall, 2013b). But Whitehead’s ontological wager is 
simultaneously a radically empirical approach, the main 
motivation for which is to provide a more coherent 
account of living experience than that offered by scientific 
materialism or transcendental phenomenology. Following 
Friedrich Schelling (2007), Whitehead’s organic realism 
could be described as a form of  “higher” or “metaphysical 
empiricism” (p. 169; see also Segall, 2016a, p. 71). 
Whitehead grounds experience in energetic processes that 
run deeper than the collisions between the spatialized 
surfaces of material bodies that the mind is supposed to 
gain access to through nothing but the outward facing 
senses. Whitehead (1979) refers to this more superficial 
mode of experiential access through the outward facing 
senses as “presentational immediacy” (p. 121ff). A 
more deeply rooted form of temporal experience, what 
Whitehead (1979) refers to as “causal efficacy” (p. 121ff), 
puts the mind in direct contact with, and is itself an 
expression of, physical processes. By rooting experience 
in energetic transmission itself, Whitehead thereby 
overcomes the bifurcation between psyche/life and physics 
that is intrinsic to the mediational frame.
 Where Dreyfus and Taylor (2015) extend 
Merleau-Ponty’s “unmediated body-based intentionality” 
(p. 48) only to humans or animals, and where other 
embodied phenomenological thinkers go only so 
far as to allow biological intentionality, Whitehead’s 
panexperientialism grants to every society of actual 
occasions in nature—whether electromagnetic, cellular, 
neural, or stellar—at least “prehensional” contact with 
its surroundings (Segall, 2016a, p. 143ff). The concept 
of prehension is Whitehead’s attempt to resolve what 
Dreyfus and Taylor (2015) call the most “notorious 
problem of the tradition of modern philosophy” (p. 
29) by articulating a truly amphibious account of the 
apparent boundary between spontaneity and receptivity. 
Whitehead’s new concept of prehensive unification is 
offered as a replacement for the more abstract concept 
of causal impact and its associated view of a dead and 
disconnected nature whose final real constituents are fully 
and inertly present “at an instant.” Instead, prehension 
entails a process-relational view of the concrete passage 
of living nature, where the final real creatures composing 
nature are not inert material things but actual occasions 
of experience. Concrete nature is thus “a complex 
of prehensive unifications,” with space and time 
“[exhibiting] the general scheme of interlocked relations 
of these prehensions” (Whitehead, 1967, p. 72). Each 
actual occasion “arises as an effect facing its past and ends 
as a cause facing its future” (Whitehead, 1933, p. 194). 
Each occasion of experience’s concrescence of past effects 
with future possibilities breathes life into the present 
moment again and again, providing the eternal pulse 
driving nature’s becoming. Whitehead (1979) writes:
The oneness of the universe, and the oneness of each 
element in the universe, repeat themselves to the 
crack of doom in the creative advance from creature 
to creature, each creature including in itself the 
whole of history and exemplifying the self-identity 
of things and their mutual diversities. (p. 228)
“We find ourselves in a buzzing world, amid a democracy 
of fellow creatures,” as Whitehead (1979) puts it elsewhere 
(p. 50). The most concrete reality of the cosmos is thus 
not a static structure but a creative and relational process, 
more an open-ended “Creality” (Segall, 2016a, p. 25) 
than a finished reality. Living nature is thus described 
most concretely by Whitehead  (1933) as “the throbbing 
emotion of the past hurling itself into a new transcendent 
fact” (p. 177). 
 Whitehead’s unbifurcated interpretation of 
the relationship between the physical nature known to 
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science and the conscious human doing the knowing 
is a systematic cosmological extension of James’ radical 
empiricism. James is another thinker not mentioned 
by Dreyfus and Taylor whose more than century-old 
efforts to overcome the mediational picture by way of 
a radical return to experience are more than relevant to 
the successful navigation of their dilemma. It is hardly 
an exaggeration to say that James already traversed the 
territory Dreyfus and Taylor (not to mention Heidegger, 
Wittgenstein, and Merleau-Ponty) tried to cover. James’ 
radical empiricism was an attempt to dissolve the 
mediational epistemology’s abstract, dualistic conception 
of the relation between knowing subjects and known 
objects. For much of Western philosophical history, James 
(1904) wrote in his essay “A World of Pure Experience,” 
the process of knowing reality 
has assumed a paradoxical character which all 
sorts of theories had to be invented to overcome. 
Representative theories put a mental “representation,” 
“image,” or “content” into the gap, as a sort of 
intermediary. Common-sense theories left the gap 
untouched, declaring our mind able to clear it by 
a self-transcending leap. Transcendentalist theories 
left it impossible to traverse by finite knowers, and 
brought an Absolute in to perform the saltatory 
act. All the while, in the very bosom of the finite 
experience, every conjunction required to make the 
relation intelligible is given in full. . . . Knowledge 
of sensible realities…comes to life inside the tissue 
of experience. It is made; and made by relations that 
unroll themselves in time. . . . That is all that knowing 
. . . can be known-as, that is the whole of its nature, 
put into experiential terms. (pp. 539-540)
 Dreyfus and Taylor’s attempt to heal the 
mediational wound alienating moderns and postmoderns 
alike from contact with reality fails as soon as they cede the 
in itself—the known objects of a bifurcated nature—to 
the falsely ontologized methods of instrumental science. 
Furthermore, by restricting the for itself structure of 
subjectivity exclusively to humans, or at most extending 
it to animals or cellular life, their approach remains 
anthropocentric and residually Cartesian.8 Whitehead’s 
cosmological generalization of Jamesian radical 
empiricism does not challenge Dreyfus and Taylor’s 
(2015) conviction that “natural science describes the 
structure of the universe in itself with which our coping 
is, from the start, in direct contact” (p. 144). It just asks 
what the structure (or, better, the creative process) of 
the universe must be like at the most primordial level 
such that the evolution of creatures capable of adaptive 
and intelligent coping makes any sense. How is it that 
the universe over which humans think they are gaining 
progressively more technological control has generated 
experiential agencies capable of getting such a handle 
on it? What sort of primordial conditions could have 
allowed for such increasingly conscious consequences? 
To accept the problem space of this question as one in 
which blind causality must somehow be understood to 
transact with, and even to have produced consciousness, 
is to wander right back into the thicket of the mediational 
frame. Whitehead’s cosmological scheme demolishes 
the mediational frame once and for all, allowing 
philosophers to step back into a full-blooded reality 
within which vibrating photons and beautiful sunsets 
carry equal ontological weight. Whitehead (1968) invites 
philosophers to imagine a world wherein “the energetic 
activity considered in physics is the emotional intensity 
entertained in life” (p. 168). It is a bold and radical 
ontological wager that might just be worth the risk. 
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 Notes
1.   Several critical reviews of Retrieving Realism have 
been published. These include articles by Godfrey-
Smith (2015) and by Roth (2015), as well as a blog 
review by Gerlach (2015). 
2.   Keeping in mind that the discussion of propositions 
in Retrieving Realism fails to distinguish between 
verbalizable logical judgments and the sorts of 
non-conscious “propositional feelings” described 
by Whitehead (1979), it seems clear enough that 
Whitehead would have had more sympathy for the 
spirit of Dreyfus and Taylor’s perspective than for 
McDowell’s. Whitehead articulated a generalized 
theory of propositional feelings that distinguishes 
unconsciously prehended propositions from linguistic 
judgments by conscious subjects (a distinction most 
logicians fail to consider). He thus extends the role 
of propositions in the universe far below the level of 
human thought and perception all the way down to 
the fundamental processes of the physical world.
3.  See Segall, 2013a for an alchemical approach to 
cosmological hybridization. 
4.  See Segall, 2016a, p. 247ff for a less procrustean, 
Schellingian-Deleuzean rendering of Whiteheadian 
theology. See also Segall, forthcoming 2017 for a 
Whiteheadian account of the evolutionary history of 
human religious expression. 
5.   The term was originally coined by Gaston Bachelard 
(1953), but is now widely employed in scholarly 
literature to refer to the modern entanglement of 
scientific knowledge, technological power, and 
society (see also Latour and Woolgar, 1979). 
6.     To be fair, Dreyfus and Taylor (2015) do mention the 
“Gaia principle” (p. 156) in passing as an example 
of a nascent view of nature arising to challenge the 
still dominant view of nature as a dead resource to be 
exploited (on the philosophical implications of Gaia 
theory see also Segall, 2012). But they fail to recognize 
the significance of the full spectrum of new paradigm 
sciences that have emerged over the last century. 
7.  See Segall, 2016b for a more detailed treatment of 
Whitehead’s novel philosophical interpretations of 
these 20th century scientific paradigms.
8.   This is because the gap between life and dead matter is 
no less ontologically profound than the gap Descartes 
inserted between extended bodies and thinking minds. 
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